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Abstract
Decentralized data markets gather data from many contributors to cre-
ate a joint data cooperative governed by market stakeholders. The ability
to perform secure computation on decentralized data markets would allow
for useful insights to be gained while respecting the privacy of data con-
tributors. In this paper, we design secure protocols for such computation
by utilizing secure multi-party computation techniques including garbled
circuit evaluation and homomorphic encryption. Our proposed solutions
are efficient and capable of performing arbitrary computation, but we re-
port performance on two specific applications in the healthcare domain to
emphasize the applicability of our methods to sensitive datasets.
1 Introduction
One of the challenges of building a decentralized data market [6] is providing
adequate protection for the privacy of data contributors. Data contributors
might be unwilling to contribute sensitive information into a data market if
they lack adequate protections for their data. Economic considerations may ease
some of these worries, but for high-value datasets more powerful cryptographic
tools may be necessary to secure user data.
In this paper, we introduce a scenario where different data contributors
(makers) wish to share their data (listings) to make data available for buyers
who wish to perform specific computations on aggregated data. We assume
makers are not comfortable sharing plaintext data. Therefore, our main goal
in this work is performing computation on protected and aggregated data. In
many examples in practice, these listings are not necessarily physically stored
in one database (datatrust) or are not always owned by one organization.
In previous work we introduced decentralized data markets [13, 6] which
provide a powerful framework for constructing datasets with distributed owner-
ship and control. We also introduced the maker/listing/datatrust terminology
which we will reuse in this current paper. In these scenarios, storing protected
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
01
48
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
 Ju
l 2
01
9
listings and performing computation on them is not straightforward. Who per-
forms encryption upon listings? How is computation done on encrypted data?
In this paper, we explore these questions on two healthcare inspired examples:
performing logistic regression on the breast cancer Wisconsin Dataset [1], and
the linkage disequilibrium test on GWAS data. We design a secure solution
to compute both logistic regression and linkage disequilibrium tests, but our
designed protocol is general and can be used to perform arbitrary computation.
In the following sections, we first provide some background related to the
computation of logistic regression [8], linkage disequilibrium [12], and other
cryptographic tools [14, 17, 18]. Then we introduce our designed protocols, and
at the end provide our experimental results.
2 Background
In this paper we study two sample computational problems: logistic regression
(LR) and the on linkage disequilibrium (LD) test performed genome-wide as-
sociation study (GWAS) data. We design protocols for performing these com-
putations on encrypted data and base on two cryptographic techniques: Ho-
momorphic Encryption (HE) and Garbled Circuit (GC). In the following, we
briefly provide needed background before moving to the design of our proposed
protocol.
2.1 Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is a statistical method for analyzing a dataset in which there
are one or more independent variables that determine an outcome. In this
paper, our focus is on binary LR where LR is used to predict the relationship
between independent variables and a dependent variable where the dependent
variable is binary. We can divide the computation of LR into two categories:
training and testing. In training, a model is trained based on training samples
and parameters are computed. In testing, the trained model is applied on test
cases. There are some standard open source tools to perform the training phase
of LR such as TensorFlow [2], PyTorch [10], and SKLearn [11]. For the rest of
this paper, we assume that we have access to a trained LR model and all its
learned parameters and only focus on the implementation of LR for the testing
phase.
For LR during the testing phase, if we have fixed dimension n, precomputed
parameters W = (w1, . . . , wn) and b (W and b are regression coefficients of a
trained model), and a sample X = (x1, . . . , xn), then we can compute probabil-
ity p as:
p =
eX·W+b
1− eX·W+b
As you can see in the computation of p, if we can compute eX·W+b, we can
easily compute the rest of the probability. We focus on computing this quantity
on encrypted data in section 4.
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2.2 Genome-Wide Association and Linkage Studies
In sections 2.2.1-2.2.2, we provide more background about genomic data and
LD test computation [15].
2.2.1 Genomic Background
DNA is a sequence of nucleotides {A,C,G, T}. An individual’s collection of
genes is called a genotype and the physically observable characteristics of an
individual are called a phenotype. A genetic marker is defined as a gene or a
DNA segment with a known locus (location) on a chromosome, which is typically
used to help link an inherited disease with the responsible gene. Then a set of
closely linked genetic markers found in one chromosome that tend to be inherited
together is called a haplotype.
A single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) represents a common type of a
genetic variation among people in a single nucleotide that occurs at a specific
locus in a genome. One of a number of alternative forms of a gene at a given locus
is called an allele. The most common and least common alleles that occur in a
given population are called major and minor alleles, respectively. We denote a
major allele by a capital letter, e.g., A, and a minor allele by the corresponding
lowercase letter, e.g., a. An individual inherits two alleles for each gene, one
from each parent. If the two alleles are the same, the individual is homozygous
for that gene and is heterozygous otherwise. Based on that information, we
distinguish between the following categories: homozygous reference genotype,
denoted as AA; heterozygous genotype, denoted as Aa; and homozygous variant
genotype denoted as aa. We refer to the two alleles inherited for a particular
gene as a genotype.
Let N denote the total number of collected alleles in a pool of genes. We
then use NA and Na to denote the number of major and minor alleles in the
observed population, respectively. Similarly, NAA, NAa, and Naa denote the
number of gene variants of the type AA, Aa, and aa, respectively. They are
used to compute values NA and Na as
NA = 2NAA +NAa, Na = 2Naa +NAa.
In addition, an allele frequency is defined as the number of this allele in a
certain locus in the observed population. In other words, we define major and
minor allele frequencies pA and pa as pA = NA/N and pa = Na/N , respectively.
A genotype frequency can be defined analogously.
2.2.2 Linkage Disequilibrium
Linkage disequilibrium is an important notion in population genetics that occurs
when genotypes at two different loci are not independent of each other. In other
words, LD is the non-random association of pairs of alleles that often descend
from a single ancestral chromosome. Consider two loci A and B with two alleles
each (A, a, B, and b). There are 9 possible genotypes AABB, AABb, AAbb,
3
AaBB, AaBb, Aabb, aaBB, aaBb, aabb, and there are four haplotypes AB,
Ab, aB, ab. Let us use NAB , NAb, NaB , and Nab as the number of instances of
each of the four haplotypes in the observed population. Then, their population
frequencies are computed as:
pAB =
NAB
N
, pAb =
NAb
N
, paB =
NaB
N
, pab =
Nab
N
.
When the alleles’ frequencies are independent (i.e., we have linkage equilib-
rium), we expect that:
pAB = pApB , pAb = pApb, paB = papB , pab = papb.
where, as before, pA = NA/N , pa = Na/N and similarly pB = NB/N , pb =
Nb/N , but now NA = NAB + NAb, Na = NaB + Nab, NB = NAB + NaB ,
Nb = NAb +Nab. However, if the alleles are in LD, the formulas become:
pAB = pApB +DAB , pAb = pApb −DAB , paB = papB −DAB , pab = papb +DAB .
The parameter DAB is called the coefficient of LD and can be computed as
DAB = pAB − pApB .
Chi-square statistics for the hypothesis H0 of no disequilibrium (i.e., DAB =
0) is computed as:
χ2A,B =
2N ·D2
pA · pa · pB · pb =
2N · (N ·NAB −NA ·NB)2
NA ·Na ·NB ·Nb
H0 is rejected (i.e., LD is present) if χ
2
A,B exceeds a particular threshold or
2N · (N ·NAB −NA ·NB)2 > χ2A,B ·NA ·Na ·NB ·Nb.
2.3 Cryptographic Tools
We design our secure computation protocols using Homomorphic Encryption
(HE) and Garbled Circuit (GC). Note that we can use any HE including additive
HE and fully HE, but in here we are more interested in exploring fully HE (e.g.,
Paillier encryption as the additive HE and Lattice-based cryptography as fully
HE). In the following we describe HE and GC briefly and then focus on details
of the proposed solution.
2.3.1 Homomorphic Encryption
HE is a type of encryption that allows computation to be performed on en-
crypted data without revealing any information about the original data. In
here, we use a specific type of HE where its key is defined in a public-key cryp-
tosystem. This scheme is defined by three algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec), where
Gen is a key generation algorithm that on input of a security parameter 1κ pro-
duces a public-private key pair (pk, sk); Enc is an encryption algorithm that on
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input of a public key pk and message m produces ciphertext c; and Dec is a
decryption algorithm that on input of a private key sk and ciphertext c pro-
duces decrypted message m or special character ⊥ that indicates failure. For
conciseness, we use notation Encpk(m) or Enc(m) and Decsk(c) or Dec(c) in
place of Enc(pk,m) and Dec(sk, c), respectively. A semantically secure encryp-
tion scheme guarantees that no information about the encrypted message can
be learned from its ciphertext with more than a negligible (in κ) probability.
Note that, in secure computation based on HE, the complexity of a proto-
col is measured based on non-free (expensive) operations. As an example, in
additive HE, addition is a free operation and multiplication is counted as an
expensive operation. Therefore, to optimize a solution we need to minimize
non-free operations. We can also provide the complexity of a designed protocol
based HE in terms of communication and computation complexities of no-free
operations. While, fully HE supports arbitrary computation and it is a more
powerful tool, but we need to define a specific noise budget for sequential mul-
tiplication operations which affects the performance of a computation. Since,
we use the SEAL library for implementation, more information about fully HE
can be found in [14].
2.3.2 Garbled Circuit
The use of GC allows two parties P1 and P2 to securely evaluate a Boolean circuit
of their choice. That is, given an arbitrary function f(x1, x2) that depends on
private inputs x1 and x2 of P1 and P2, respectively, the parties first represent is
as a Boolean circuit. One party, say P1, acts as a circuit generator and creates
a garbled representation of the circuit by associating both values of each binary
wire with random labels. The other party, say P2, acts as a circuit evaluator and
evaluates the circuit in its garbled representation without knowing the meaning
of the labels that it handles during the evaluation. The output labels can be
mapped to their meaning and revealed to either or both parties.
The fastest currently available approach for circuit generation and evaluation
we are aware of is by Bellare et al. [5]. It is compatible with earlier optimiza-
tions, most notably the “free XOR” gate technique [9] that allows XOR gates to
be processed without cryptographic operations or communication, resulting in
virtually no overhead for such gates. A recent half-gates optimization [19] can
also be applied to this construction to reduce communication associated with
garbled gates. In addition, there are some recent works on GC compilers (e.g.,
[16, 7]) which are designed based on [5].
An important component of garbled circuit evaluation is 1-out-of-2 Oblivious
Transfer (OT). It allows the circuit evaluator to obtain wire labels corresponding
to its inputs. In particular, in OT the sender (i.e., circuit generator in our case)
possesses two strings s0 and s1 and the receiver (circuit evaluator) has a bit σ.
OT allows the receiver to obtain string sσ and the sender learns nothing.
Note that, in the two-party setting solution based on GC, the complexity
of an operation is measured in the number of non-free (i.e., non-XOR) Boolean
gates because of optimization in XOR gate. Also, some computations like shift
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operation do not consist of any kind of gate and it is totally free. Therefore, to
have an optimized solution, we need to minimize the number of non-XOR gates
by using more free operations during the computation instead. In addition, we
can report the complexity of a designed protocol in terms of the number of
non-free gates.
3 Designed Protocols
In both of the following protocols, we assume we have access to Crypto Service
Provider (CSP), who is a trusted third party with access to implementations
of cryptographic standards and algorithms. (Such a CSP could possibly be
added as a participant in future versions of the Computable protocol [6]) We
also assume the presence of a datatrust (DT), makers oi where i = 1, . . . , n, and
buyers sj where j = 1, . . . ,m. At the end of protocol execution, each sj learns
the result of a secure computation.
3.1 Homomorphic Encryption Protocol
In HE, we have access to its three main algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec). In this
section, we use fully HE (FHE) developed by Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV)
and Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) as implemented by the SEAL library [14].
We introduce our solution in Protocol 1 and associated Figure 1.
3.2 Garbled Circuit Protocol
Next, we describe the details of the proposed solution based on GC. We have
the same architecture as in Protocol 1, but instead of HE, GC is used as the
underlying cryptographic tool. In this setting, the CSP needs to have enough
computational power and storage to perform the garbling process. We introduce
our solution in Protocol 2 and associated Figure 2.
4 Experimental Results
In this section we evaluate the performance of our solution. The garbled circuit
implementations were written in C and used the JustGarble library [5, 4] for
circuit garbling and evaluation. Our code supports the half-gates optimization
[19]. The FHE implementations were performed using the SEAL library [14].
All the computation for GC was run on a 3.3GHz machine, and for HE was run
on a 2.7GHz machine, and experimental runs were repeated 10 times and mean
values reported.
4.1 Linkage Disequilibrium Results
The GC protocol for the LD test results is reported in Table 1. Note that for
the LD test, we vary the value of N to demonstrate how this variable affects
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Figure 1: Designed protocol based on HE with steps corresponding to those in
Protocol 1.
performance of the computation. Furthermore, we also vary the number M of
SNPs or alleles for which each test is run, with all M instances of each test
being executed at the same time.
In addition, we implemented the LD test for the Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren
(BFV) scheme by using the SEAL Library [14]. Running the LD test takes
54.2 seconds when M = 10, and runtime grows linearly with the size of M .
Further details about the execution time are provided in Table 2. The SEAL
library provides the facility to run HE operations in a batch. The LD test is
very amenable to batch computation, and our execution becomes about 3000
times faster when all independent operations are run in a batch. Note that in
our experiment, we set the polynomial modulus degree to 8192 and coefficient
modulus to 128 and we reported the upper-bound of space complexity in Table
2. Note that in FHE, M is the only LD test parameter that is important in the
experiments because based on the selected parameters of FHE, the variable size
of N is covered.
7
Protocol 1:
Inputs: Security parameter κ, a set of data (x1, . . . , xn) where xi belongs to maker
oi, and function f which can be arbitrary computation (e.g., LR or LD tests).
Outputs: Each sj learns f(x1, . . . , xn).
1. CSP generates a public-private key pair (pk, sk) ← Gen(1κ), and makes pk
available for everyone.
2. Each oi encrypts it own listing by computing ci = Encpk(xi), and submits ci
to DT.
3. Each sj can send a query to DT to receive (c1, . . . , cn).
4. Each sj computes C = f
′(c1, . . . , cn) = Encpk(f(x1, . . . , xn)). f ′ can be
defined and performs by using homomorphic properties of the underlying HE
scheme.
5. Each sj can send C to CSP, and CSP computes f(x1, . . . , xn) = Decsk(C)
and sends the result to sj .
4.2 Logistic Regression Results
For the LR test, the computation becomes more complicated, since the expo-
nentiation operation is not supported by the standard SEAL and JustGarble
libraries. One potential solution to implement this operation is by using a
private lookup table [3]. In this approach we precompute the values of the ex-
ponential function for the desired precision and the range of input values and
use private lookup to select the output based on private input.
Consider an exponentiation function (Exp) that needs to be evaluated on
private input a and in our case, it is defined over fixed-point arithmetic. Let
the value of a be in the range [amin, amax] with N denoting the number of the
elements in the range. Then the approach consists of precomputing the function
on all possible inputs and storing the result in an array Z = (z0, . . ., zN−1).
Consequently, evaluation of the function on private a corresponds to privately
retrieving the needed element of the array Z using a to determine the index.
This procedure is formalized in the protocol Exp below. For further details, see
reference [3].
[b]← Exp([a], Z = {zi}N−1i=0 )
1. Compute [b]← Lookup(〈z0, . . ., zN−1〉, [a]).
2. Return [b].
This approach can be implemented by using a multiplexer. However, this
approach does not work well for FHE because its performance directly depends
on the range of input values. For larger range, we need more sequential mul-
tiplications in the multiplexer, and as a result a larger noise budget ensues,
making the solution less efficient. But the private lookup table is a reasonable
solution for GC based protocols. In Table 3, we report performance of LR on
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Figure 2: Designed protocol based on GC with indicated steps.
GC (testing phase) on the breast cancer Wisconsin dataset [1] where the size
of inputs is 16 bits and we have different ranges for input values (in bits) for
exponentiation operation. This dataset is a binary classification dataset with
30 dimensions and 569 sample data points.
5 Conclusions and Future Directions
In this paper, we design secure, efficient, and general protocols based on homo-
morphic encryption and garbled circuits to perform computation on sensitive
encrypted data in a decentralized data market. We use examples from health-
care to emphasize the applicability of our protocol to sensitive datasets. The
designed protocols are general and can be used for arbitrary computation, but
we report performance only on our examples of linkage disequilibrium and lo-
gistic regression. To the best of our knowledge, our designed protocols are
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Protocol 2:
Inputs: A set of data (x1, . . . , xn) where xi belongs to maker oi, a function f which
can be arbitrary computation (e.g., LR or LD tests), and a secure pseudorandom
function PRF.
Outputs: Each sj learns f(x1, . . . , xn).
1. CSP generates δ
R← {0, 1}κ−1, k R← {0, 1}κ, sets ∆ = δ||1 (concatenation),
and sends ∆ and k to ois.
2. Each oi computes wire labels l
0
(i,k) = PRF(k, i||k) and l1(i,k) = l0(i,k) ⊕ ∆ for
each bit bk of its own data, and sends all l
bk
(i,k)s to DT.
3. Each sj can send a query to DT to receive all input wires.
4. CSP creates all input label pairs by using ∆ and k and creates circuit Cf for
any f . CSP sends circuit Cf to sj .
5. Each sj can evaluate circuit Cf by using input labels, and sends output labels
to CSP.
6. CSP sends the meaning of output labels to sj .
efficiently constructed. Our architecture is especially efficient for the garbled
circuit protocol due to the fact that we eliminate oblivious transfer, the most
computationally expensive part of GC. Our designed solutions are comparable
and competitive with existing protocols including [15].
In addition, our proposed solutions are theoretically salable for larger vol-
umes of inputs, but achieving sufficient efficiency is challenging. More specifi-
cally, for lager inputs we may need to define more noise budget in HE protocol
(operations that need to be done play an important role to define noise budget)
to be able to do all computations with enough precision, and that may cause
the solution inefficient in practice. Also, the performance of the private lookup
table in GC protocol directly depends on the size of the table; therefore, using
the designed protocols for larger inputs in practice is not as straightforward as
in theory.
In the current work, the security of our design relies on the existence of an in-
dependent crypto service provider (CSP). The CSP is responsible for generating
the public-private key pair in the HE scheme, and generates security parameters
and garbles circuits in the GC scheme. In practice though, for many applica-
tions, we do not have access to such a trusted third party capable of acting as a
CSP. As a future direction, we are working on a solution to eliminate the CSP
and handle its role by performing a secure multi-party computation between
the makers themselves. This approach may add some overhead to the protocols
but it will make our design more broadly applicable for real-world use cases.
Another major limitation of the current system is that each new computation
requires a custom software implementation. For our experiments, we had to
create custom code for both logistic regression and LD testing. Performing
this implementation was nontrivial, and the computation of the exponent for
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M N garbling evaluation #gates #non-XOR gates Comm.
10
200 10.8 6.7 293550 81690 1.3
400 14.1 7.7 313370 87150 1.4
800 12.3 7.7 334510 92970 1.5
1600 16.7 10.5 356970 99150 1.6
100
200 145.4 83.6 2935500 816900 13.1
400 161.5 93.1 3133700 871500 14.0
800 124.0 75.7 3345100 929700 14.9
1600 132.9 80.2 3569700 991500 15.9
1000
200 1108.7 675.4 29355000 8169000 131.0
4000 1269.6 758.7 31337000 8715000 139.7
8000 1391.2 831.8 33451000 9297000 149.0
16000 1371.4 897.6 35697000 9915000 158.9
Table 1: Execution time for LD test in ms and the communication in MB for
GC.
M Execution Space Expected execution (batch)
10 54.2 s 18.34 MB 1840 ms
100 9.1 m 183.4 MB 0.18 s
1000 1.48 h 1.82 GB 1.84 s
Table 2: Execution time and space complexity for LD test for FHE.
logistic regression required some ingenuity. The construction of a more flexible
software framework which can allow for broader classes of computation to be
easily implemented is left to future work.
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